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327 
THE NATURE OF THE BEAST: USING THE 
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT TO COMBAT 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Claims Act (the ATCA),1 lay nearly dormant for 191 
years. Today, the ATCA is at the center of a reformation in the enforcement 
of international human rights. The rationale behind the ATCA’s enactment in 
1789 is unclear, but as it stands today, the Act provides federal jurisdiction to 
any alien alleging a tort “committed in violation of the law of nations.”2 In 
1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gave the 
ATCA an interpretation that has produced a large body of case law both 
criticizing and affirming the principles that the court announced.3 
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ,4 the Second Circuit interpreted the ATCA as 
granting federal jurisdiction to a Paraguayan citizen after she alleged that a 
former Inspector General of Police in Paraguay tortured and killed her son.5 
The court’s modern view of the “law of nations,” now more commonly 
referred to as “international law,” encouraged other plaintiffs to follow suit 
and led to even more expansive interpretations of the Act.6 In September 
2000, three separate sets of plaintiffs, emboldened by these modern 
interpretations, brought suit in federal district courts. In one suit, five 
plaintiffs from Zimbabwe filed suit against the president of that country, 
Robert Mugabe, in Federal District Court in Manhattan.7 They alleged that 
 
 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).  
 2. Id. 
 3. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Other courts, drawing from the 
Second Circuit’s holding, have interpreted the ATCA to grant the alien both a cause of action and a 
forum. See, e.g. , In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) 
(holding that the ATCA provides a cause of action as well as a forum). 
 4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 5. Id. at 878. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the Filartiga case. 
 6. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the ATCA permits 
claims against nonstate actors because international law prohibits private individuals from engaging in 
genocide); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that a private corporation 
acting jointly with a state could be held liable under the ATCA for violations of international law 
committed by the state).  
 7. The five plaintiffs all alleged that they were the victims of political violence ordered by 
President Mugabe through his political party, ZANU-PF. Graham Rayman, Zimbabwe Leader Sued, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 2000, at A3. Most of the plaintiffs were affiliated with the opposition party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Id. One plaintiff, Adella Tichaona, was the widow of the 
MDC’s youth organizer whom Mugabe’s supporters set on fire and killed while he was campaigning. 
Id. Two other plaintiffs, Elliot and Efridah Pfebve, were the brothers of an MDC parliamentary 
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Mugabe committed violations of international law during the run-up to the 
June 2000 Zimbabwean Parliamentary elections.8 In a second suit, Chinese 
plaintiffs sued the former Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in federal court for 
atrocities committed in the massacre of prodemocracy advocates in 
Tiananmen Square.9 In a third suit, fifteen Japanese plaintiffs sued Japan for 
being forced into brothels by the military during World War II.10 Suits such 
as these have prompted criticism questioning the propriety of adjudicating 
these claims in United States federal court as opposed to some other forum.11 
The effect of the suits on the U.S. government’s foreign policy has not gone 
unnoticed either.12 
Not all courts agree with Filartiga. Courts disagree with either the 
Filartiga court’s interpretation of the ATCA or on the standard to apply in 
determining whether a violation of international law has in fact taken place.13 
Critics question whether international law referred to in the ATCA grants 
rights to individual nonstate actors.14 Critics further question whether the 
“political question” and “act of state” doctrines allow such claims against 
 
 
candidate whom ZANU-PF supporters dragged from his house, and allegedly tortured and killed. Id. 
The fourth plaintiff, Evelyn Masaiti, was another MDC candidate, currently a Minister of Parliament, 
who alleged that Mugabe supporters beat her, burned her with a gasoline bomb, and forced her from 
her home. Id. The fifth plaintiff was Maria Del Carmen Stevens, the widow of the first white farmer 
that Mugabe supporters killed in the run-up to the June 2000 elections. Id. ZANU-PF thugs allegedly 
kidnapped Mr. Stevens, beat him, and forced him to drink gasoline before shooting him in the head. Id. 
 8. Bill Miller, Mugabe Sued in N.Y. over Rights Abuses, WASH . POST, Sept. 9, 2000, at A3. 
 9. Edward Wong, Chinese Leader Sued in New York over Deaths Stemming from Tiananmen 
Crackdown , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at A6. 
 10. Agence France-Presse, 15 to Sue Japan in U.S. over Sex Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2000, 
at A5. 
 11. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy , FOR. AFFAIRS, 
September/October 2000, at 102, 103. See also Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human 
Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 636 (2000). In effect, hardly any 
alternative fora exist for individual plaintiffs to bring a claim. Such situations have heretofore mainly 
been dealt with on a political front. See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTARY 211 (1997). In addition, of the mere handful of ad hoc courts created to 
deal with international violations, only two currently exist, both under the auspices of the United 
Nations: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). See United Nations, ICTY–Home Page, Dec. 26, 2001, at 
http://www.un.org/icty. 
 12. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 11, at 102 (noting that the suits have a “powerful impact” 
on America’s international relations). 
 13. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (claiming to be “substantially in accord” with the holding in Filartiga); Doe v. Unocal, 
110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that evidence private defendant knew of state’s 
forced labor practices is not enough to prove that defendant acted under color of state law, thereby 
violating international law). 
 14. As used in this Note, “nonstate actors” refers to private individuals acting in their own 
private capacity, as opposed to those representing a governmental entity. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/6
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foreign defendants to be brought at all. 15 Moreover, scholars find fault with 
this modern use of the ATCA on the grounds that it politicizes American 
courts, and that the issues deserve a more controlled response instead of 
haphazard litigation.16 Finally, commentators note that nongovernmental 
organizations often bring these ATCA lawsuits and that such entities have no 
political accountability, despite the high international exposure of these suits 
and their potential effect on U.S. foreign policy.17 
This Note attempts to show that while such criticisms should not impede 
this important development in the law of international human rights, the 
ATCA is merely one small contribution to what should be an overall scheme 
aimed at the heart of the problem: the ease and impunity with which human 
rights atrocities are committed. Part II begins with a history of the ATCA, 
from its cloudy beginnings through the landmark Filartiga decision to the 
modern day. Part III summarizes and rebuts some courts’ and commentators’ 
recent criticism of the modern use of the ATCA. Part IV attempts to show 
how international law should operate in this age of increased human rights 
awareness, using the suit against Robert Mugabe to help define the nature of 
the beast against which ATCA plaintiffs battle. 
II. HISTORY OF THE MODERN ATCA 
A. The Enactment of the Alien Tort Claims Act 
Very little legislative history surrounds the original enactment of the 
Alien Tort Claims Act in 1789. 18 Indeed, courts have noted the resulting 
difficulties in divining the legislative intent behind the Act.19 The original 
 
 
 15. Scholars describe these doctrines as a mix between prudential considerations and 
constitutional law. See infra note 132, 166-76 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra  note 11, at 103. See also Thadhani, supra note 11, at 636 
(arguing that the “beneficial side effects” that result from using the ATCA to regulate private 
corporations, namely enforcing human rights, “do not justify the use of the legal system to impose 
indirect sanctions” and that the political system should be used instead). 
 17. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra  note 11, at 11. 
 18. Much scholarly debate centers over the origins and congressional intent of the ATCA. See, 
e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the 
“Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP . L. REV. 221, 224 (1996) (arguing that the Filartiga 
reading of the statute is closer to the original intent of the ATCA than are the interpretations of the 
“originalists”); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and 
Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations,”  42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 490-91 (2000) (positing 
that despite the absence of direct records, legislative intent may be gleaned from the resolutions of the 
Continental Congress). 
 19. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that the ATCA is a “kind of 
legal Lohengrin” and that “no one seems to know [from] whence it came”). See also  Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Tel-Oren, a divided court disagreed over 
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precursor to the ATCA first appeared in the Judiciary Act of 1789.20 The 
provision gives district courts original jurisdiction over “all causes where an 
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”21 Various scholars and judges believe that Congress 
incorporated this language into the 1789 Judiciary Act to prevent the type of 
international incident that could have arisen if a country were to refuse a 
forum to a foreigner injured on its own soil.22 If the United States were to 
offer no forum to foreign visitors, the alien’s home country would have a 
claim against the United States under international law.23 As a young 
country, the United States was presumably very cautious about its obligations 
to other states under the law of nations.24 The writings of Alexander 
 
 
how to interpret the Act. Id. at 775. One source of the dispute was the inability to find authoritative 
information as to why Congress passed the Act in the first place. Id. at 812. Judge Bork’s concurring 
opinion stated that he had “discovered no direct evidence of what Congress had in mind when enacting 
the provision.” Id. He pointed out that the Senate debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789 (of which the 
Alien Tort Claims Act was a part) were not even recorded, and that the House debates did not even 
mention the provision. Id. However, other courts and commentators have looked for indirect evidence 
of what Congress was hoping to achieve in opening up the federal courts to suits by aliens. For a 
discussion of the indirect evidence, see infra text accompanying note 22. 
 20. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
 21. Dodge, supra note 18, at 224.  
 22. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[u]nder the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice 
accessible for claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state’s territory”). See also 
Debra A. Harvey, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply ‘Historical 
Trivia’? , 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 343 (1988). 
 23. Marc Rosen, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Policy 
Solution, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L &  COMP.  L. 461, 464 (1998). See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 
(Edwards, J., concurring) (noting that if a foreigner were denied a forum, then “under the law of 
nations the United States would become responsible for the failure of its courts and be answerable not 
to the injured alien but to his home state”). 
 24. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 211 (citing Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 
Dall.) 111 (1784)). In Respublica, a case that predates the United States Constitution, the court 
convicted an alien for violating the law of nations under the common law of Pennsylvania. Respublica, 
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 114. The defendant, a French citizen, had assaulted the consul-general of France to 
the United States on U.S. soil. Id. at 111-12. However, immediately following the incident, many 
leading Americans including George Washington and Thomas Jefferson expressed concern over the 
fact that Pennsylvania was so indecisive in taking action in the matter that serious international 
consequences could result. JANIS & NOVES, supra  note 11, at 211. In fact, the case “provided 
ammunition for those favoring the creation of a federal judiciary under the U.S. Constitution with 
jurisdiction to hear cases involving foreign citizens.” Id. 
 These prominent Americans made successful arguments because the Constitution does indeed 
extend jurisdiction to “[c]ontroversies . . . between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Jurisdiction over cases between two aliens is 
predicated on Article III Section 2 clause 1 in that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.” Id. International law has been recognized as being 
part of the “laws of the United Stat es” and such recognition dates back to the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth Centuries. See, e.g., Respublica, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 111. The Supreme Court recognized this 
fact in the case of The Paquete Habana with the famous phrase that “[i]nternational law is part of our 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/6
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Hamilton demonstrate these concerns.25 In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton 
argued that “[t]he Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers 
for the conduct of its members” and that because “the denial or perversion of 
justice by the sentences of the courts, as well as in any other manner, is with 
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal 
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other 
countries are concerned.”26 
B. Origins of the Law of Nations 
The idea of international law may have originated with the Roman 
civilization and the use of a jus gentium, or “law of nations.”27 It referred to 
the law that the Romans applied in cases involving foreigners when the law 
of the foreigners’ own country was unknown.28 In 1625, the Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius argued that the law of nations also applied to the emerging 
countries of Europe in their dealings with one another.29 In 1789, the English 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham renamed this notion “international law,” and 
today, the terms “the law of nations” and “international law” are used 
interchangeably.30 A number of sources embody the specific rules of 
international law.31 Courts consult treaties,32 the works of jurists33 or 
 
 
law.” 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). This notion is demonstrated by the fact that in Respublica, 
Pennsylvania convicted the defendant under the criminal common law of that state, which was 
construed to include violations of international law. Respublica, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 114. 
 However, commentators have not always accepted the notion that international law is 
incorporated into the laws of the United States, but the issue encompasses a larger question concerning 
the relationship between a country’s municipal law and international law. See, e.g., Andrew D. 
Mitchell, Genocide, Human Rights Implementation and the Relationship Between International and 
Domestic Law, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 15, 25-28 (2000). The discussion on this question centers on the 
split between the monist and dualist views of international law. See id. at 25-30 (explaining the monist 
versus dualist philosophy). Monists subscribe to the theory that international law and municipal law 
are part of the same legal system, and that international law supercedes contrary municipal law. Id. at 
25-26. Dualists, on the other hand, hold that municipal law and international law are separate systems 
entirely, and that municipal systems must expressly adopt international law in order to incorporate 
such law into the state’s system. Id. at 26. 
 25. Hamilton expressed some of these concerns in the Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 80 at 509 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Seigliano ed., 2000). 
 26. Id. 
 27. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 1993). 
 28. Id. Romans would apply jus gentium  only if Roman law was also inapposite. Id.  
 29. Id. Many regard Grotius’s famous work, entitled The Law of War and Peace, as the 
foundation of the modern notion of the law of nations. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also L.C. Green, The Raw Materials 
of International Law, INT’L & COMP . L.Q. 187 (1980). In addition, Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, lists sources of 
international law the Court is to employ. The Article reads as follows: 
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international law scholars, and prior opinions construing international law.34 
Perhaps most controversially, courts also look to international custom to 
determine whether a certain practice has become so widespread and accepted 
that the court can truly label it as an international law and enforce it as such.35 
Judicial recognition that a certain practice has “ripened” into a legal norm is 
thus the process that builds the body of international customary law over 
time.36 When determining customs, courts must also consider opinio juris, or 
a sense of duty with which nations follow such custom.37 In this way, 
 
 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c.   the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d.  subject to the provisions of Article 59 [which states that the opinions of the court have no 
stare decisis effect], judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if 
the parties agree thereto. 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE , Art. 38. The term “ ex aequo et bono” refers to 
principles of equality that the court feels it should apply in a given case. JANIS & NOYES, supra note 
11, at 21. Such principles are not found in any body of law, but are simply the reflections of the judges 
as to what they consider as “equal and good”. Id. Perhaps because of this vague definition, no party 
has ever elected to submit a case for the court to decide ex aequo et bono . Id. at 129. 
 32. Treaties can provide the court with evidence of an international custom that has become so 
widespread that it reflects an international legal norm. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 
882-84 (1980). See also infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra note 196. A court examines the works of jurists in order to discover international 
legal norms that have developed. 
 34. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that judicial opinions and 
juridical writings are to be secondary sources of what the rules of international law are. See supra note 
31. In addition, Article 38 does not state which courts to look to in order to find authoritative 
pronouncements on international law. Id. In fact, courts are free to look to the opinions of any 
municipal or international tribunal. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 108. 
 35. Because custom is commonly seen as a nonconsensual source of international law, this 
method is controversial. Id. at 66. Furthermore, courts must face the same problem with regard to 
where to look for evidence of custom. Id. at 107. Courts have in the past merely examined the judicial 
opinions of western legal systems, but this practice has been rejected. Id. at 108 (citing GERRIT W. 
GONG , THE STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984)). 
 36. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-700 (1900) (finding that a custom 
prohibiting the capture of fish ing vessels during war time that could be traced back to 1403 through the 
birth of the United States and into the modern day had sufficiently ripened into international law). 
 37. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97 (June 27) (finding 
states’ adoption of a United Nations resolution as evidence of opinio juris). Opinio juris is the idea that 
countries feel a duty to follow a certain custom, and that they treat the custom as though it were law. 
JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 75. Opinio juris is required before a court will recognize that a 
custom has become part of international law. Id.  
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widespread custom, coupled with opinio juris, can ripen from merely a 
common practice into an international legal norm.38 
C. Use of the ATCA 
Early cases concerning jurisdiction under the ATCA mostly involved 
piracy or war prize actions.39 However, because of the Supreme Court’s 
narrow interpretation, the Act was used extremely rarely for most of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.40 In addition, the law of nations was far 
from the substantive body of law that it is today. Several decades of 
international cooperation under the United Nations41 and cases from the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) have made international law significantly 
more discernable.42 Even in the middle of the twentieth century, courts 
hesitated to grant jurisdiction under the ATCA because of their outdated 
view of the law of nations43 and their belief that the original purpose of the 
ATCA was to prevent international incidents.44 In fact, courts only heard 
twenty-one lawsuits under the ATCA prior to 1980 and granted jurisdiction 
in only two.45 
1. The Filartiga Decision 
In 1980, the landmark decision of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala46 renewed the 
vitality of the then 191-year-old Alien Tort Claims Act. In that case, the 
plaintiffs were the father and sister of a seventeen-year-old Paraguayan boy 
whom the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay allegedly 
 
 
 38. Congress has also expressed its agreement with this proposition in recognizing that “norms 
. . . may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 
(1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86. 
 39. See Harvey, supra note 22, at 344 n.18. See also  Moxon v. Brigantine Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 
(D. Pa. 1793) (seeking restitution for capture of ship); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) 
(claiming damages for wrongful capture and sale of slaves). 
 40. See Harvey, supra note 22, at 344 & n.18. 
 41. JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 445. 
 42. The International Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the United Nations and has 
rendered decisions on international customary law. Id. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 43. In fact, William Blackstone identified only three offenses that could violate the law of 
nations, these being “violations of safe conduct, infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.” Rosen, supra note 23, at 466 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67). 
 44. See Rosen, supra note 23, at 468. 
 45. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the 
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 nn.15 & 16 (1985). The two cases in which the 
court granted jurisdiction are Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795), and Adra v. Clift, 195 F. 
Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). 
 46. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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tortured and killed.47 The plaintiffs were Paraguayan citizens who brought an 
action against the former police Inspector General, also a Paraguayan citizen, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
predicating jurisdiction on the ATCA.48 The district court dismissed the suit 
for lack of jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that 
international law should be interpreted as it exists today, not as it existed in 
1789.49 The court went on to find that torture violates modern international 
law and that therefore federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists under the 
ATCA.50 
The court first looked to Supreme Court precedent and discovered that 
international law may be ascertained by “consulting the works of jurists . . . 
or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions 
recognizing and enforcing that law.”51 The court then examined several 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and other treaties that 
condemn the use of torture in an effort to find evidence that the proscription 
on torture had become an international custom.52 In finding such a custom, 
the court noted that the prohibition of torture as contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights constitutes one of the “basic principles of 
 
 
 47. Id. at 878. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant kidnapped, tortured, and killed Joelito 
Filartiga. Id. Later that day, the police allegedly took Joelito’s sister,  Dolly, to the defendant’s house 
where they confronted her with the battered body of her brother. Id. Dolly alleged that as she fled, the 
defendant followed her and called out that she had got what she deserved. Id. She claimed that her 
brother was tortured and killed in retaliation for her father’s opposition to the government of President 
Alfredo Stroessner. Id. 
 48. The plaintiffs claimed that torture violated the “law of nations” as referenced in the ATCA 
and that therefore the Act granted them a federal forum. Id. at 879. 
 49. Id. at 881. 
 50. Id. at 880. The court had personal jurisdiction over the Paraguayan defendant because he had 
been served with summons while in the United States on a visitor’s visa. Id. at 878. He was later 
deported because he overstayed the length of his visa. Id. at 878-79. 
 51. Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820)). The court 
confirmed these sources by quoting from The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), and from 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 630 F.2d at 880-81 & n.8. See supra note 31 and 
accompanying text. 
 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s enumeration of the sources of the law of nations in The Paquete 
Habana, the court concluded that a practice can ripen and evolve into an international law by the 
“general assent of civilized nations.” 630 F.2d at 881. Therefore, the court concluded that international 
law is not static and must therefore be interpreted “not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and 
exists among the nations of the world today.” Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 52. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882-84. The court pointed to, inter alia, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which states that “no one shall be subjected to torture.” Id. (quoting G.A. Res. 217(III), 
U.N. Doc. A/810, (1948)). The court also relied on the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. 
Doc. A/1034 (1975); the American Convention on Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1986); and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Art. 3, Jan. 1, 1966, Europ. T.S. No. 55, 200, 202. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 . 
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international law.”53 After reviewing multiple sources, the court concluded 
that torture violates international law to such an extent that the “torturer has 
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, 
an enemy of all mankind.”54 This rationale has led some commentators to 
note that it is unclear whether the court’s reasoning rested on customary 
international law or on the principle of jus cogens.55 The latter principle 
states that certain acts are so despised that they are simply forbidden, and the 
prohibition against such acts achieves the status of a peremptory norm that is 
binding without regard to a state’s consent.56 Whichever formulation the 
court meant to employ, the result is the same—torture committed under color 
of law violates the law of nations as it exists today and therefore invokes the 
federal jurisdiction granted by the Alien Tort Claims Act.57 The court found 
this holding consistent with the original intent of the Act because it addressed 
the “Framers’ overarching concern that control over international affairs be 
vested in the new national government to safeguard the standing of the 
United States among the nations of the world.”58 
In reaching its decision in Filartiga, the Second Circuit had to overrule 
some of its own precedent construing international law.59 In fact, the district 
court had dismissed the Filartigas’ suit for lack of jurisdiction because the 
judge had felt “constrained by dicta contained in two recent opinions” of the 
Second Circuit.60 These cases held that international law did not apply to a 
state’s treatment of its own citizens.61 However, relying on the principle that 
international law is not static and must be read as it exists in the modern 
 
 
 53. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882 (quoting G.A.Res. 2625. U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)). 
 54. Id. at 890. 
 55. See, e.g., JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 121-22 (citing Mark Janis et al., Colloquy: Jus 
Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359 (1988)). 
 56. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 108. Article 53 of The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties defines a peremptory norm (jus cogens) to be “a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.” The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
344. Article 53 voids any treaty that is concluded in violation of a jus cogens norm. Id. 
 57. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85. Also note that a state official conducted the torture, acting at 
the very least under color of state law. 
 58. Id. at 887. The court believed that Congress had intended to provide a forum for aliens just 
like the Filartigas in order to prevent the international incident that would occur if an infraction of the 
law of nations were to go unpunished. Id. 
 59. Id. at 880, 884. 
 60. Id. at 880. The cases were Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976), and IIT v. 
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
 61. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.  
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day,62 the court found that international law in 1980 prohibited torture even if 
perpetrated by a state on its own citizens.63 The Filartiga decision, therefore, 
was a major turning point in the interpretation of the ATCA. 
2. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic  
The Filartiga decision was not universally accepted by all federal circuits. 
In fact, four years later the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit declined to exercise jurisdiction under the ATCA in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic .64 However, the three judges in the case each gave 
differing opinions as to the underlying rationale for declining jurisdiction.65 
Only Judge Edwards agreed with the basic holding of Filartiga, although his 
application led him to a different result in this case.66 
In Tel-Oren, the plaintiffs were several survivors of a terrorist attack in 
Israel by members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).67 The 
terrorists landed in Israel by boat and embarked on a violent rampage against 
civilians.68 The plaintiffs alleged that these terrorists were under orders from 
the PLO “to seize and hold Israeli civilians in ransom for the release of PLO 
members incarcerated in Israel jails” and if their plans broke down, to kill the 
civilian hostages.69 In the course of the vicious campaign, the terrorists seized 
two buses, one taxi, and one passing car and held the occupants hostage.70 
The terrorists tortured the passengers and murdered some of them.71 In all, 
twenty-two adults and twelve children were killed, and seventy-three adults 
 
 
 62. See discussion supra note 51. The court held in  line with The Paquete Habana that the 
prohibition on a state from committing torture on its own citizens had evolved and ripened into an 
international law. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. 
 63. Id. The court’s holding suggests, therefore, that the very reach of the law of nations can itself 
develop over time in the same manner as do the substantive rules that form the body of customary 
international law. Id. 
 64. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 65. Id. There was no majority opinion in the case, but instead, three separate opinions concurring 
in the judgment that jurisdiction should be denied. The panel comprised Judges Harry T. Edwards, 
Robert Bork, and Roger Robb. Id. 
 66. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring).  
 68. Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). The PLO terrorists numbered thirteen. Id. 
 69. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. The campaign began with the terrorists killing an American photographer that they 
encountered on the beach. Id. They then hijacked a civilian bus on the main highway between Haifa 
and Tel Aviv and later seized a taxi, another passing car, and a second civilian bus and took the 
occupants hostage. Id. 
 71. Id. The police finally brought the rampage to an end by shooting the tires and engine of the 
terrorists’ bus as it passed through a police barricade. Id. The terrorists in turn shot some of their 
hostages and blew up their bus with grenades. Id. 
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and fourteen children were seriously wounded.72 As in Filartiga, the 
plaintiffs73 in this case asserted jurisdiction under the ATCA.74 
In denying ATCA jurisdiction in Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards found the 
principles established in Filartiga to be sound.75 However, he concluded that 
international law does not impose liability on nonstate actors for torture, and 
that because the PLO is not a state,76 its members cannot act under color of 
state law.77 Therefore, he reasoned that the terrorists were free from the 
 
 
 72. Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 73. The plaintiffs were sixty-five of the hostages who the terrorists had seriously wounded and 
the survivors of twenty-nine of the hostages who were killed. Id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring). The plaintiffs also asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(1976), claiming a federal question. Id. at 799. 
 75. 726 F.2d at 776-77 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards stated that the Filartiga case 
stands for four propositions, which include: 
First, the law of nations is not stagnant and should be construed as it exists today among the 
nations of the world. Second, one source of that law is the customs and usages of civilized nations, 
as articulated by jurists and commentators. Third, international law today places limits on a state’s 
power to torture persons held in custody, and confers fundamental rights upon all people to be free 
from torture. Fourth, section 1350 [i.e., the ATCA] opens the federal courts for adjudication of the 
rights already recognized by international law. 
726 F.2d at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge 
Edwards then confirmed that he was “substantially in accord with these four propositions.” Id. 
(Edwards, J., concurring). 
 76. Judge Edwards noted that in order to determine whether an entity qualifies as a state for the 
purposes of international law, courts have traditionally looked to United States foreign policy. 726 
F.2d at 791 n.21 (Edwards, J., concurring). Cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995). 
This view is no longer the prevailing one because the Second Circuit has held that the law of nations 
can indeed obligate unrecognized states. Id. 
 In Kadic, the court had to determine whether the self-proclaimed entity of Srpska within the 
recognized nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a “state” for purposes of international law prohibiting 
official torture. Id. Turning to the definition of a “state” given by the Third Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, the court determined that a state is an entity with a defined territory 
and population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Id. The court 
noted that the entity need not be formally recognized by other states in order to have the capacity to 
enter into relations with them. Id. Rather, the court noted that   
[i]t would be anomalous indeed if non-recognition by the United States, which typically reflects 
disfavor with a foreign regime—sometimes due to human rights abuses—had the perverse effect 
of shielding officials of the unrecognized regime from liability for those violations of international 
law norms that apply only to state actors.  
Id. at 245. 
 Whether the PLO would satisfy this test of statehood for purposes of “official action” committed 
in violation of international law is unclear, but quite possibly it could. Judge Edwards’s dismissal of 
such a possibility was cursory, stating that “there is no allegation here that the PLO does or could meet 
this standard [of statehood].” Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 n.21 (Edwards, J., concurring). One certainty 
exist s: an entity may be considered a “state” for some purposes, yet not for others. See JANIS & 
NOYES, supra note 11, at 366. For example, an entity may be considered a state for purposes of 
international law violations, but not for purposes of being admitted to the United Nations or being a 
party before an international tribunal. Id. 
 77. An individual acts under the “color of state law” when he performs an action with the 
apparent, but not necessarily the actual, backing of a state’s power or laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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restrictions of international law—the court could not grant jurisdiction under 
the ATCA because the plaintiffs could not allege any violation of 
international law.78 Judge Edwards believed a finding of jurisdiction under 
the ATCA in Tel-Oren would be “an extension of Filartiga” that he was 
unwilling to undertake.79 
In his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, Judge Bork agreed that 
international law was confined to imposing obligations upon state actors,80 
but he rejected the Filartiga holding and rationale.81 Judge Bork believed that 
the reference to the “law of nations” in the ATCA was only intended to cover 
those violations of international law that existed in 1789.82 At that time, only 
three offenses were violations of the law of nations: violations of safe 
conduct, infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.83 Judge 
Bork’s opinion seemed to limit the ATCA to only these three violations.84 
However, in order to conform with the line of reasoning extracted from the 
Court’s early case, The Paquete Habana,85 concerning the evolutionary 
nature of international law,86 he distinguished Filartiga on its facts: 
It is one thing for a case like The Paquete Habana to find that a rule 
has evolved so that the United States may not seize coastal fishing 
boats of a nation with which we are at war. It is another thing entirely 
. . . to find that a rule has evolved against torture by government so 
that our courts must sit in judgment of the conduct of foreign officials 
in their own countries with respect to their own citizens . . . . [The 
 
 
(1994). The court in Kadic v. Karadzic held that the jurisprudence of § 1983 is a relevant guide in 
determining “color of law” for purposes of violations of international law. 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 
1995). See infra note 130. 
 78. 726 F.2d at 776-77 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 80. Judge Bork believed in “the general rule that international law imposes duties only on states 
and on their agents or officials.” Id. at 805-06 (Bork, J., concurring). Much academic literature 
supports this view, although the literature also recognizes the trend toward placing duties upon 
nonstate actors and individuals. See Rosen, supra note 23, at 469. See also discussion infra  note 110. 
 81. Specifically, Judge Bork rejected the view that courts should read the law of nations as 
referenced in the ATCA to be the equivalent of modern international law. 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork, J., 
concurring). He was particularly troubled by the fact that “[h]istorical research has not as yet disclosed 
what [the ATCA] was intended to accomplish.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 813 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork found it “important to remember that in 1789 
there was no concept of international human rights.” Id. 
 83. The scholar William Blackstone enumerated these offenses. See Rosen, supra note 23, at 
466. See also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 84. 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 85. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).  
 86. See discussion supra note 51. Judge Bork stated that the framers did not intend the ATCA to 
grant federal jurisdiction in cases such as Filartiga. 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring). He stated 
that this “problem is not avoided by observing that the law of nations evolves.” Id. 
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ATCA] does not embody a legislative judgment that is either current 
or clear and the statute must be read with that in mind.87 
In addition, Judge Bork believed that the ATCA could only grant 
prospective plaintiffs a federal forum; it did not provide the underlying cause 
of action, or substantive right to sue.88 Nor did Judge Bork find such a right 
in international law itself.89 Rather, he found that even if international law 
prohibited torture, it did not grant the injured parties a right to sue the 
perpetrators in court.90 In his opinion, the Second Circuit should have 
embarked on this very question in Filartiga.91 Finally, Judge Bork stated that 
recognizing the plaintiffs’ suit would be “inappropriate” because of 
“separation of powers principles” included in, among others, the act of state 
doctrine.92 However, he stopped short of applying the act of state doctrine 
directly because he felt constrained by the Supreme Court’s definition that 
the doctrine only applies to acts of recognized states.93 Reasoning that the 
PLO is not a recognized state,94 Judge Bork noted that the doctrine seemed 
 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). He concluded that the ATCA “merely define[s] a class of 
cases federal courts can hear . . . [but does not] even by implication authorize individuals to bring such 
cases.” Id. at 811. Judge Edwards disagreed with Judge Bork on this point as well, arguing that if 
neither international law nor the ATCA provided a right to sue, then the ATCA would be, in effect, 
negated. Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring). See also infra note 183. 
 89. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816. Judge Bork stated that “international law today does not provide 
plaintiffs with a cause of action.” Id. Judge Bork also conducted an extensive review of the treaties 
under which the plaintiffs alleged that their action arose. Id. at 808-09. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants had violated thirteen treaties, but Judge Bork concluded that the United States was only 
bound by five of them. Id. Judge Bork found that the treaties did not provide a cause of action because 
the five applicable treaties in the plaintiffs’ complaint do not specifically provide for private 
enforcement; nor do treaties “generally create rights that are privately enforceable in courts.” Id. To 
hold otherwise, Judge Bork reasoned, would be to hold that because of the ATCA, “all existing treaties 
became, and all future treaties will become, in effect, self-executing when ratified.” Id. at 820. 
 90. Id. at 817. He stated that “as a general rule, international law does not provide a private right 
of action.” Id. According to Judge Bork, the right of action belongs to the state itself, but not the 
individual, because international law recognizes that states are the primary players. Id. The Second 
Circuit has confronted the question of whether international law can apply to actors other than state 
entities and has found that indeed it can. See discussion infra note 110. 
 91. Id. at 820 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 799, 805 (Bork, J., concurring). See discussion infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
The Supreme Court has defined the act of state doctrine as precluding “the courts . . . from inquiring 
into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own 
territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). 
 93. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 94. Judge Edwards also rejected the idea that the PLO could be a state, but his analysis was in t he 
context of a person being a “state actor.” Id. at 791 n.21 (Edwards, J., concurring). However, neither 
Judge Edwards nor Judge Bork conducted any meaningful discussion of whether the PLO could be a 
“state” for purposes of international law. Id. at 775, 798. Judge Bork merely stated that the act of state 
doctrine “would seem not to apply . . . to the alleged acts of the PLO . . . [which does not] seem to be a 
state under international law.” Id. at 803-04 (Bork, J., concurring). See discussion, supra note 76. 
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facially inapplicable;95 nevertheless, he argued that the doctrine should be 
extended by “its own rationale” to include acts by nonrecognized entities.96 
Judge Robb found that the suit in Tel-Oren should be dismissed on other 
grounds—he decided that the case presented a nonjusticiable political 
question.97 He stated that the judiciary should not decide cases that interfere 
with issues that are traditionally left to the political branches of government. 
Judge Robb argued that cases involving international terrorism “touch on 
sensitive matters of diplomacy that uniquely demand a singlevoiced 
statement of policy by the Government.”98 The suit in Tel-Oren, according to 
Judge Robb, was just such a case. 
Finally, Judge Robb disagreed with Filartiga, calling the Second Circuit’s 
holding an “unfortunate position.”99 He included little discussion of the 
ATCA and its construction in his opinion and called his colleagues efforts at 
doing so “quite unnecessary.”100 A fair summation of his position is that he 
completely disagreed with the new turn that the Second Circuit took in the 
Filartiga case, and he counseled against any further intrusion into the foreign 
affairs arena in this manner.101 
3. Kadic v. Karadzic  
Kadic v. Karadzic ,102 like Filartiga, arose in the Second Circuit. The 
plaintiffs were Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who 
alleged that they were victims and representatives of victims of a genocide 
campaign.103 The military forces of the self-proclaimed republic of Srpksa, 
within Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the direction of the defendant, Radovan 
 
 
 95. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803 (Bork, J., concurring). Although unsure of the doctrine’s 
applicability, Judge Bork concluded that there was no need “to consider whether the act of state 
doctrine applies to bar this case from going forward.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 804. Judge Bork found that the case presented such “grave separation of powers 
problems” that it would be “inappropriate” for the court to recognize a cause of action for the 
plaintiffs. Id. at 805. 
 97. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). The “political question” doctrine is taken up in more detail 
below. See infra  notes 132, 171 and accompanying text. Judge Edwards took issue with Judge Robb’s 
invocation of the doctrine in this case. Id. at 796 (Edwards, J., concurring). After noting that not every 
case involving foreign affairs lies outside of the purview of the judiciary, he asserted that the political 
question doctrine is very narrow in scope and should not be used by courts as an excuse to avoid 
adjudicating difficult and complicated questions. Id. at 797 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 824 (Robb, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 826 (Robb, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 827 (Robb, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. (Robb, J., concurring). 
 102. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 103. Id. at 236-37. 
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Karadzic, carried out this campaign.104 The plaintiffs asserted causes of 
action for “genocide, rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, torture and 
other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and 
ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.”105 They asserted 
subject-matter jurisdiction under, inter alia , the ATCA.106 
The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction because no 
violation of the law of nations had been alleged, as required under the 
ATCA. The court held that “acts committed by non-state actors do not 
violate the law of nations,”107 and relied in part on the Filartiga decision for 
this proposition. 108 The court noted that the defendant in Filartiga had acted 
as a government official (Inspector General of Police), whereas Karadzic was 
not a state actor because Srpska was not a recognized state.109 However, the 
Second Circuit reversed, holding that international law can indeed apply to 
individual nonstate actors when they engage in genocide and war crimes.110 
The Second Circuit conducted a thorough review of the actions that courts 
and commentators had recognized as violations of international law, and 
found that some nonstate actors could indeed be held liable in certain 
circumstances.111 Drawing from the Third Restatement of the Foreign 
 
 
 104. The forces committed the atrocities during the Bosnian civil war, allegedly as part of a 
genocidal campaign. Id. Karadzic possessed ultimate command authority over the military forces. Id. 
at 237. 
 105. Id. at 237. 
 106. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the atrocities committed were violations of international law 
and that because they were aliens, jurisdiction existed under the ATCA. Id. 
 107. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 108. Id. In fact, the court implied that the Filartiga decision was itself an example that 
international law “evolved” from formerly imposing obligations only on states’ relationships with each 
other, to now encompassing a state’s relationship with its own citizens. Id. The court repeatedly 
emphasized that the Filartiga case dealt only with a state actor and noted that international law has not 
been extended to impose obligations on nongovernmental actors. Id. at 739-40. Including a reference 
to Judge Edwards’s opinion in Tel-Oren, the district court pointed out that “a number of Federal 
Courts have applied . . . [the ATCA] but, in doing so, have also declined to extend it to cover the 
conduct of nonstate actors.” Id. at 740. 
 109. Id. at 739, 741. The court noted that just as the PLO did not constitute a recognized state in 
Tel-Oren, neither did Sprksa. Id. Therefore, the court held that Karadzic could not have acted under 
color of state law and was thus beyond the reach of international law. Id. See supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
 110. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40. The court noted that whether a nonstate actor can be held liable 
under international law depends entirely on the crime alleged. Id. Indeed, “certain forms of conduct 
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as 
private individuals.” Id. at 239. Genocide and war crimes are examples of such forms of conduct, but 
torture is not. Id. at 240. 
 111. Id. Pointing to the Nineteenth Century cases of United States v. Smith , 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 
153, 161 (1820), and United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196-97 (1820), as well as to 
modern scholars in international law, the court noted that an early example of the nonstate actor reach 
of international law was the prohibition against piracy. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. Modern examples 
include the prohibitions against the slave trade and certain war crimes. Id. 
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Relations Law of the United States, as well as from the two cases prior to 
Filartiga that had exercised jurisdiction under the ATCA, the court found 
support for this conclusion.112 
Turning to the specific allegations of genocide, the court conducted an 
examination into the accepted sources of international law to determine 
whether nonstate actors could be liable for such conduct.113 After examining 
authorities such as United Nations General Assembly Resolutions,114 the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,115 
and the United States’ Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987,116 
the court concluded that private individuals could indeed be liable for 
genocide under international law.117 
Similarly, the court assessed the conventional sources of international 
law118 and found that the law of nations prohibits as war crimes acts of 
murder, rape, torture, and the arbitrary detention of civilians when 
“committed in the course of hostilities.”119 The court also found that the law 
of nations controls the conduct of private as well as state actors.120 The 
sources that the court used included four Geneva Conventions, ratified by 
180 countries, codifying the law of war.121 These conventions confirm that 
 
 
 112. Id. The two cases prior to Filartiga to find jurisdiction under the ATCA were Bolchos v. 
Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795), and Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). The 
defendants in both of these cases were nonstate actors. See supra note 45. 
 The Second Circuit’s opinion also responded to the district court’s reliance on Judge Edwards’s 
opinion in Tel-Oren. The court noted that Judge Edwards did not foreclose the possibility that 
international law could prohibit certain private conduct. Rather, he merely held that torture was not 
one of those violations applicable to private actors as well. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. 
 113. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
 114. In 1946, a U.N. General Assembly Resolution declared genocide to be a crime under 
international law, whether perpetrated by “private individuals, public officials or statesmen.” 70 F.3d 
at 241 (quoting G.A. Res. 96(I), 1 U.N. GAOR at 188-89, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, (1946)). In addition, 
the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, set up by the United Nations, received a mandate to punish 
persecutions regardless of whether the offenders were acting as individuals. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241. 
 115. Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, cited in 70 F.3d at 241. This Convention defined genocide to 
include actions taken by persons “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, 
or private individuals.” 70 F.3d at 241 (quoting 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280). 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988), cited in 70 F.3d at 242. This Implementation Act prohibits 
genocide regardless of whether the perpetrator acts under color of law. 70 F.3d at 242. 
 117. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42. 
 118. Id. at 242. Just as the Filartiga court had done, in addition to reviewing treaties and other 
sources, the Kadic court consulted international practices, conventions, and norms as evidence of 
international law. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
 119.  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242, 244. 
 120. Id. at 242-43. Citing to a Supreme Court decision, In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946), 
the court noted that such acts have “long been recognized in international law as violations of the law 
of war.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242. The question for determination was, however, whether private 
individuals could be liable for such violations. Id. 
 121. The court examined the following four treaties: the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 
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all “parties,” whether private or state actors, are bound by the law of war.122 
Such longstanding practice, coupled with recognition by scholars,123 
convinced the court that the prohibition against pr ivate individuals 
committing war crimes had ripened into an international norm.124 
Turning to the allegations of torture and summary execution, the court 
held, with one important exception, that international law only proscribes 
these specific crimes when committed by state  officials or by persons acting 
under color of law.125 However, the court carefully noted the exception that if 
a private individual carried out torture or summary execution in the 
pursuance of a genocide campaign, then that individual could be held liable 
under international law.126 Because Karadzic allegedly tortured the plaintiffs 
while on a genocide campaign, he could be held liable for that torture, even if 
he were found to be a private nonstate actor.127 The Kadic court further held 
that Karadzic was indeed a state actor because of his connection with the 
self-proclaimed state of Srpska.128 Even though Srpska was not recognized 
by the United States, the court was satisfied that for purposes of international 
law, it was a “state,”129 or at the very least, the defendant was acting under 
color of law.130 
 
 
75 U.N.T.S. 31; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; the 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135; and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Oct. 
21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 n.7. The United States ratified all 
four. Id. at 242. 
 122. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. 
 123. The court cited to various scholarly works in support of its conclusion. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. 
These works were: Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law, 450 INT’L 
CONCILIATION 241 (1949); Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes Jurisdiction over 
Civilians in Federal District Courts, in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (Richard 
A. Faulk ed., 1976). 
 124. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. 
 125. Id. The court reached this conclusion after drawing from three authoritative definitions of 
torture: the Declaration on Torture, supra  note 52; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and the Torture 
Victim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(b) (1993). All three sources defined torture as being inflicted by a 
public official. Furthermore, this definition parallels that given by the Filartiga court, where the 
defendant was in fact a public official. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 126. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. The court noted that the plaintiffs’ allegations of genocide and war 
crimes encompassed many of their torture and summary execution allegations. Id. Therefore, 
jurisdiction existed for their claims either because the atrocities allegedly  committed were war crimes, 
or because they were crimes committed in the furtherance of a campaign of genocide. Id. Neither of 
these two options required the participation of a state actor for jurisdiction to exist under the ATCA. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 245. 
 129. See supra note 76. 
 130. The court proceeded to hold that even if Srpska were not a state, the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged that Karadzic had acted in concert with the recognized state of Yugoslavia and was 
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The court then assessed the claim that the case against Karadzic presented 
a nonjusticiable “political question” that was best left to the political 
branches of government.131 This doctrine is a prudential consideration that a 
court uses to dismiss a case when jurisdiction would normally be proper were 
it not for the intrusion into matters better left to the executive or legislative 
branches.132 After acknowledging Judge Robb’s concurrence in Tel-Oren,133 
the court concluded that the doctrine was inapplicable in Kadic .134 Relying 
on the Supreme Court’s treatment of the “political question” doctrine in 
Baker v. Carr,135 most importantly the factors that the Court established in 
that case,136 the Kadic  court cautioned that “[n]ot every case ‘touching 
foreign relations’ is nonjusticiable.”137 The court applied the Baker factors 
and found that they supported the exercise of jurisdiction even though the 
case implicated very well publicized foreign matters, such as ethnic cleansing 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.138 A letter from the Solicitor General and the State 
 
 
hence acting under “color of law.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. The court noted that acting under color of 
law suffices for a claim of “official” torture under international law. Id. Furthermore, the court noted 
that the “‘color of law’ jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant 
has engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the [ATCA].” Id. 
 131. The court recognized that despite having found that jurisdiction existed under the ATCA, 
prudential considerations could still counsel against the court hearing the case. Id. at 249. 
 132. Id. According to some constitutional law scholars, the doctrine “rests on a blend of themes, in 
part reflecting normal constitutional interpretation and in part resting on prudential considerations that 
counsel against rulings that might generate excessive conflicts with the other branches.” GERALD 
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45-46 (13th ed. 1997). These authors 
also recognize that some commentators refute the fact that any such doctrine exists. Id. at 46. 
However, courts continue to look to the Supreme Court opinion of Baker v. Carr when confronted 
with an argument raising the political question doctrine. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962)). 
 133. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. Judge Robb did not discuss the ATCA in much detail when he 
dismissed the action in Tel-Oren for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Robb, J., concurring). Instead, he relied solely on the 
“political question” doctrine. Id. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 134. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250. 
 135. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 136. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court set out a number of factors for a court to apply when 
confronted with the political question doctrine. 369 U.S. at 217. A court is to determine whether the 
case involves the following: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id. 
 137. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
 138. When the court applied the Baker factors, it found that the coordinate branch to whom the 
issue at hand had been committed was “none other than our own—the Judiciary.” Furthermore, the 
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Department’s Legal Adviser denying that the suit presented any 
nonjusticiable political question further assuaged the court.139 
The Kadic case seems to extend Filartiga by expanding of the law of 
nations to hold private individuals liable. On the other hand, the Filartiga 
court found that only a state “official” could violate the prohibition on 
torture.140 However, commentators have recognized the Kadic decision as 
simply an application of the principles laid out in Filartiga—that 
international law must be read as it exists today, and must be found by 
ascertaining the international consensus on a given violation. 141 The Kadic 
court found that the international consensus was to hold individual nonstate 
actors liable for only certain actions, and that among these are genocide and 
war crimes.142 
 
 
fact that judicially manageable standards exist for resolving the question at hand “undermines the 
claim that such suits relate to matters that are constitutionally committed to another branch.” Kadic, 70 
F.3d at 249. Citing to Filartiga, the court held that judicially manageable standards of discovering 
international law did in fact exist, as was shown in that case. Id. 
 The standard’s existence “obviates any need to make initial policy decisions of the kind normally 
reserved for nonjudicial discretion.” Id. 
 The final three factors come into play only when “judicial resolution of a question would 
contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited contexts where such 
contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental interests.” Id.  
 139. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250. The letter further noted that “[a]lthough there might be instances in 
which federal courts are asked to issue rulings under the Alien Tort Statute . . . [i.e., the ATCA] . . . 
that might raise a political question, this is not one of them.” Id. The court was quick to point out, 
however, that “even an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, [although] 
entitled to respectful consideration, would not necessarily preclude adjudication.” Id. 
 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected an argument based upon the political question doctrine as it 
relates to the ATCA in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo . See 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996). Without much 
discussion, the court found that the official torture of former Ethiopian prisoners did not amount to a 
nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 848. The court quoted Baker, stating that “it is error to suppose 
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Id. 
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
 140. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 141. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 23, at 491 (acknowledging that “viewing the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Kadic as an application, rather than an expansion, of Filartiga seems appropriate”). Cf. 
David P. Kunstle, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable Rights and 
Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP . & INT’L L. 319, 321 (1996) (noting 
that Karadzic “departs substantially” from Filartiga by holding nonstate actors liable. 
 142. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. Nor was the Kadic court the first to recognize private individual 
liability under international law. The court itself acknowledged that the “liability of private individuals 
for committing war crimes has been recognized since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg 
after World War II.” Id. For documentation on the cases at Nuremberg, see Court TV, Famous Cases: 
A Look Back at Nuremberg , Dec. 26, 2001, at http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/nuremberg/ 
index.html.  
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4. Doe v. Unocal 
Doe v. Unocal,143 decided by the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California, is one of the more recent cases to test the limits 
of the ATCA. In Unocal, the court held that a private corporation acting 
jointly with a state could be held liable under the ATCA for state violations 
of international law.144 The plaintiffs were Burmese villagers and the 
survivors of villagers145 who alleged that the Burmese military government 
(called the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC)146 used 
violence and intimidation to relocate entire villages, to torture and enslave 
farmers, and to rape the women left behind after relocation in order to build a 
pipeline for the private corporate defendants.147 The plaintiffs further alleged 
that the corporate defendants knew of SLORC’s human rights abuses, and 
that by entering into an agreement whereby Unocal paid SLORC to provide 
armed “security for the pipeline,” they benefited from SLORC’s use of 
forced labor.148 The plaintiffs sued for damages under theories of, inter alia , 
forced labor, crimes against humanity, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, assault and battery, and negligence.149 The defendants moved for 
dismissal on the grounds that subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist under 
the ATCA.150 
In denying the defendants’ motion, the court drew from both Ninth151 and 
Second Circuit152 precedent. The court held that subject-matter jurisdiction 
existed under the ATCA because the defendants had acted under color of law 
to effectively commit human rights violations, even though the SLORC 
 
 
 143. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 144. Id. at 891. 
 145. Id. at 883.  
 146. The SLORC government renamed the country Myanmar shortly after coming into power. Id. 
at 884. 
 147. Id. at 885. The defendants were actually two corporations, Unocal Corporation and Total 
Corporation. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 883-84. 
 150. Id. at 884. 
 151. The court relied on the seminal Ninth Circuit case construing the ATCA, In Re Estate of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Marcos II), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). Unocal, 963 
F. Supp. at 890. 
 152. The court relied on Kadic for the proposition that international law can indeed hold private 
individuals liable for a “handful of crimes.” Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. The court even noted that 
its holding squared with Judge Edwards’ opinion in Tel-Oren. The court noted that despite holding that 
the Tel-Oren plaintiffs had no jurisdiction under ATCA, Judge Edwards had recognized that in some 
circumstances private individual liability may lie under international law, even absent state action. Id. 
at 891. 
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government actually carried out the torture and forced labor.153 In effect, the 
court treated the private corporate defendants as though they were state 
actors for the purposes of international law.154 This rationale was necessary 
to uphold a finding of subject-matter jurisdiction over the torture claims 
because, according to the Kadic155 and Tel-Oren156 courts, international law 
requires that a state “official” carry out the torture.157 
The color of law rationale was not necessary to find jurisdiction over the 
forced labor claims.158 The court held that forced labor was an international 
law violation that private entities could indeed commit and did not require 
official state action.159 Pointing to both Judge Edwards’ Tel-Oren 
concurrence and the Second Circuit’s Kadic  opinion, the court noted the long 
history of including slave trading in “that ‘handful of crimes’ for which the 
law of nations attributes [private] individual responsibility.”160 The court 
found that forced labor by SLORC, coupled with payment by the defendants 
for SLORC’s services, was tantamount to slave trading.161 Therefore, the 
private defendants could be held liable for violating the international law 
prohibiting slave trade.162 
 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 891-92. The Unocal court followed the Kadic court’s holding that the ACTA’s 
“color of law” requirement be examined under the standards developed for the Civil Rights Act. Id. 
See supra note 130. Examining Supreme Court precedent interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court 
found that a private party can act under color of law when it acts in concert with the state. 963 F. Supp. 
at 891. This “joint action” rationale led the court to hold that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that 
the defendants were “jointly engaged with state officials” so that the defendants were acting under 
color of law. Id. 
 155. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 156. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 157. The court did not need to conduct a search of the customs of civilized nations or the juridical 
writings of international law scholars to determine that torture violates international law because the 
court was bound by the Ninth Circuit decision, In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights 
Litigation (Marcos II) . Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human 
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)). In Marcos II, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
prohibition on torture is actually a jus cogens norm. 25 F.3d at 1475. See supra note 56. 
 158. The court found two reasons for finding subject -matter jurisdiction over the forced labor 
allegations: first, private individuals were working in concert with the state, and second, the slave-
trade rationale. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. See infra text accompanying note 161. 
 159. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891. The Kadic court held that genocide and war crimes were also 
violations that private individuals could commit. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 120. 
 160. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. 
 161. Id. 
 162. A possible explanation for the court offering two rationales for finding jurisdiction over the 
forced labor claim is that, as the Unocal court itself acknowledged, the Ninth Circuit had not directly 
confronted the question whether private individuals could be held liable under international law. Id. at 
892 n.10. In using the slave-trade rationale, the District Court actually followed Second Circuit 
precedent because the Ninth Circuit’s private liability holdings conflicted with one another. In Marcos 
I, the Ninth Circuit “stated, without significant analysis, that “[o]nly individuals who have acted under 
official authority or under color of such authority may violate international law.’” Unocal, 963 F. 
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In sum, the interpretation of the ATCA and its effectiveness as a 
“watchdog” against human rights abuses underwent a major shift with the 
Filartiga decision and has come a long way since then.163 The ATCA 
expanded out of the purely public sphere with the Kadic decision164 and 
crossed the murky line into the private domain where it seems to be firmly 
planted in Unocal.165 The Unocal decision has been viewed as part of a big 
step forward in the fight for human rights.166 Although Unocal was 
ultimately dismissed on the merits,167 the basic premise that even large 
multinational corporations can be held liable based on their complicity with 
foreign governments has drawn much attention and some criticism.168 
 
 
Supp. at 891 (quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights Litigation  (Marcos I), 978 
F.2d 493, 501 (9th Cir 1992)). However, in Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, the “Ninth Circuit ignored its 
earlier comment . . . and merely noted . . . that it did ‘not need to reach the issue of whether the law of 
nations applies to private as opposed to governmental conduct.’” Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892 n.10 
(quoting Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, the color-of-law 
rationale that the Unocal court employed was in line with this Ninth Circuit dictum because the court 
found that the defendant was acting under color of state law. Id. at 891. 
 163. In his opinion in Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards asserted that he was “substantially in accord” with 
Filartiga. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). See discussion supra Part II.C.2. The Second Circuit expounded on the Fila rtiga 
principles to hold that private individuals could be held liable for some violations of international law. 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995). See discussion supra Part II.C.3. Finally, the 
Unocal court concluded that a private corporate defendant could itself be liable for violations of 
international law that require state action, merely by acting in concert with a state. Unocal, 963 F. 
Supp. at 891. See discussion supra Part II.C.4. 
 164. Note that Kadic, like Filartiga, was a Second Circuit opinion. See discussion supra Part 
II.C.3. 
 165. Note that although Unocal was a District Court decision in the Ninth Circuit, the Court drew 
on principles from the more developed law in the Second Circuit. See discussion supra note 162. 
 166. See Elizabeth Amon, Coming to America: Alien Tort Claims Act Provides a Legal Forum for 
the World , NAT. L.J. , Oct. 23, 2000, at A1. 
 167. See Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000). On defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, the court found that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence that the defendant 
had participated in or influenced the SLORC military’s conduct or that the defendants had “conspired” 
with the military. Id. at 1306-07. Furthermore, the court found that no evidence showed that the 
defendants had “controlled” the military’s decision to commit the violations. Id. at 1307. Based upon 
these findings, the court found for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ claims that Unocal had acted under 
“color of law.” Id.  
 The court also found for the defendants on the forced labor claims, pointing out that there were 
“no facts suggesting that Unocal sought to employ forced or slave labor.” Id. at 1310. In addition, the 
court held that while Unocal may have known about the military’s use of forced labor and benefited 
from it, “such a showing is insufficient to establish liability under international law.” Id. 
 168. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra  note 11, at 103 (warning that holding private corporations 
liable will subject developing countries to conflicting pressures). See also infra note 200. 
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III. RECENT CRITICISM CONCERNING MODERN USE OF THE ATCA 
A. Constitutional Arguments 
1. The Political Question Doctrine 
Several defendants in ATCA actions have raised the defense that the 
claims before the court constitute nonjusticiable political questions because 
of their international, and therefore political, nature.169 This constitutional 
doctrine prohibits courts from deciding issues that are best left to the political 
branches.170 However, courts disagree as to whether the doctrine should 
apply to ATCA cases.171 A strong proponent of applying the doctrine in these 
suits was Judge Roger Robb, as shown by his concurrence in Tel-Oren.172 
Judge Robb hardly examined the ATCA at all, but rather held that the 
question was a political one and therefore not fit to be decided by the 
judiciary.173 
2. The Act of State Doctrine 
The act of state doctrine holds that a court in one country may not “sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own 
territory.”174 The doctrine arose under common law,175 but according to the 
Supreme Court, has “‘constitutional’ underpinnings.”176 The Supreme 
Court’s rationale is that a judicial pronouncement on the validity of foreign 
acts may “hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals.”177 
Defendants to ATCA claims often invoke the doctrine, although such a 
 
 
 169. The Tel-Oren and Kadic courts confronted this issue. See supra notes 97, 131-39. 
 170. See supra note 132. 
 171. Compare the opinions of Judges Bork and Robb in Tel-Oren with the Kadic decision. See 
supra notes 97, 132-39 and accompanying text. While Judges Bork and Robb base their opinions in 
large part on the political question doctrine, the Kadic court simply applied the Baker factors and 
found no justiciability problem at all. See supra note 136. 
 172. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., 
concurring). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
 175. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 688. 
 176. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). The constitutional 
implications arise from the doctrine’s concern with the “basic relationships between branches of 
government in a system of separation of powers.” Id. In his Tel-Oren concurrence, Judge Bork 
expressed his opinion that the act of state doctrine should be merged with the political question 
doctrine because both deal with fundamental separation of powers principles. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 
805 (Bork, J., concurring). He posited that the analysis in each should be along the same lines. Id. 
 177. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
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defense has not yet been successful. However, no court has ruled definitively 
that a bright line rule exists as to whether the doctrine applies to ATCA 
claims.178 Therefore, litigants contest the issue in every ATCA claim, and it 
is still a hurdle for every plaintiff to overcome.179 
B. Interpretation of the ATCA 
As the above discussion discloses, courts disagree on how to interpret the 
ATCA. An early issue of contention was whether the ATCA grants a 
plaintiff a cause of action as well as a federal forum.180 The Filartiga court 
did not confront the issue, but Judges Edwards and Bork in Tel-Oren strongly 
disagreed with one another.181 Judge Edwards argued that international law 
by its very nature does not grant a cause of action to prospective plaintiffs, 
but rather leaves each state to decide how its municipal law will deal with 
international law violations, if at all.182 He argued that it would therefore be 
contrary to the intent of the ATCA to find that it denies plaintiffs a cause of 
action and only grants a federal forum.183 In that case, aliens would actually 
have no forum at all because they would not be able to find any right to sue 
in international law.184 Judge Bork disagreed, believing that for reasons 
related to the act of state doctrine, the ATCA should not be read to grant the 
alien a right to sue.185 
A second point of contention over ATCA interpretation is whether 
 
 
 178. Margaret G. Perl, Not Just Another Mass Tort: Using Class Actions to Redress International 
Human Rights Violations, 88 GEO. L.J. 773, 790 (2000). 
 179. Id. at 790. 
 180. In addition to Judges Edwards and Bork in Tel-Oren, the Kadic court recognized the issue. 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995). However, in Kadic the court found it unnecessary 
to decide definitively whether the ATCA grants a cause of action and simply rested its holding on 
Filartiga. Id. 
 181. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). Judge Edwards believed that the ATCA granted both a forum and a right to sue, but Judge 
Bork held that the ATCA only granted the forum. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). He believed that 
the alien must invoke some other substantive right to sue. Id. See also supra note 88 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777-78 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 183. Id. More precisely, Judge Edwards argued that holding that the ATCA does not grant a cause 
of act ion would eviscerate a portion of the Act completely because, according to Judge Edwards, 
international law by definition does not grant causes of action. Id. 
 184. See id. at 778. Judge Edwards also argued that the ATCA does not use the “arising under” 
language that the federal question jurisdiction statute does, and that Congress would have used that 
language if its intent had been to require a showing of a separate cause of action. Id. at 779. See also 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 & 1998 Supp.) 
 185. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 804 (Bork, J., concurring). See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying 
text. 
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international law can apply to private individuals.186 Rather than maintaining 
a per se rule that no private individual can be liable under the ATCA, courts 
have generally looked to the specific substantive international law violation 
to determine whether private individuals are susceptible to such claims.187 
However, at least one judge in the Tel-Oren court believed that, as a general 
rule, international law as a whole applied only to actions of states.188 
Finally, courts debate whether Filartiga correctly reasoned that the 
ATCA refers to international law as it exists today, or as it existed in 1789, 
the time of the ATCA’s original passage.189 Judge Bork in Tel-Oren noted 
that while the law of nations may evolve, courts must view international law 
as it existed in 1789 in order to apply the legislative intent of the ATCA.190 
Judge Bork argued that because no concept of “international human rights” 
existed at that time, Congress could hardly have intended courts to use the 
ATCA in the way that the Filartiga court construed it.191 
More courts seem to favor the Filartiga interpretation of the ATCA than 
the Tel-Oren approach.192 In addition, recent cases “expanding” on Filartiga 
are really applications of the original ideas set down by the Second Circuit.193 
This holds true especially concerning the private nonstate actor liability 
under international law.194 The second Circuit successfully rebutted the Tel-
Oren criticism that international law can never apply to private individuals. 
In Kadic , the Court simply remained true to the principle of Filartiga that 
international law can evolve, and must be interpreted as it exists today.195 
 
 
 186. See supra notes 80, 110-24 and accompanying text. Compare the opinions of Judges Edwards 
and Bork to that of the Kadic court. 
 187. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 188. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805-06 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 189. See supra notes 45, 62 and accompanying text. 
 190. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring). See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813. 
 192. At least two other circuits now accept the Filartiga interpretation. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 
72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); In Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 
1467 (9th Cir 1994). In addition, the Fifth Circuit was faced with an ATCA suit, which it dismissed on 
other grounds. Beanal v. Freeport -McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging 
Filartiga and Kadic but noting that “[a]lthough the day may come when we will have to join other 
jurisdictions who have tackled head-on complex issues involving international law, this case, however, 
does not require that we stand up and be counted”) (citations omitted). 
 193. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. The Filartiga court set out the framework for 
ATCA analysis, and one of the most important concepts recognized by the court was the evolutionary 
nature of international law. See Filartiga , 630 F.2d 876, 881. 
 194. Many ATCA plaintiffs revert to suing private individuals because of the foreign sovereign 
immunity of heads of state. Therefore, private nonstate actor liability is crucial to the success of many 
ATCA claims. See Rosen, supra note 23, at 491. See also Perl, supra note 178, at 788-92. 
 195. See supra note 51. The fundamental disagreement seems to be whether a per se rule exists 
with respect to private liability under the law of nations. The Tel-Oren court answers in the 
affirmative. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776-77 (Edwards, J., concurring). However, the Kadic court 
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Furthermore, international law “jurists”196 have agreed with the proposition 
that in some cases the law of nations does place responsibility on private 
individuals, as evidenced by the Nuremberg trials after World War II.197 This 
area of ATCA interpretation has solid foundations and has developed 
logically into a well-formed body of law that should not be abandoned 
despite some discontent by the D.C. Circuit.198 
C. Policy-Based Criticism 
Some scholars argue that in hearing ATCA litigation, courts delve into a 
very sensitive area because of the resulting “powerful impact on America’s 
international relations.”199 Two concerns are that these suits lead to the 
politicization of American courts200 and that haphazard litigation coupled 
 
 
disagrees, holding that the answer depends on the specific violation. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42. See 
also supra notes 186-88. 
 196.  Such scholars are “trustworthy evidence of what the law [of nations] really is.” The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 197. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 11, at 316 (quoting Mark W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of 
International Law, 17 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 61 (1984)). 
 198. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 199. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 11, at 102. 
 200. See id.  Scholars note that the politicization of American courts creates conflicting pressures 
on the governments of developing countries when the ACTA defendants are private corporations. Id. 
at 110. The argument is that developing countries are greatly dependent on foreign investment. While 
an ATCA suit may generate massive public support tending to push the government to side with the 
plaintiff, a large verdict against the corporation could scare away future investment. Loss of 
investment could harm the country further and thus encourage the government to side with the 
corporate defendant. Id. Furthermore, scholars argue that each country needs to set its own “economic 
priorities” and timetable for improving its human rights situation, policies that should not be dictated 
by an American court. Id. at 111. 
 A related concern is the lack of political accountability for the nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that bring most ATCA suits. Id. at 110-11. Although the authors of Plaintiff’s Diplomacy do 
not explore this concern in great detail, it is an important one that deserves a response. The argument is 
presumably that a political check on the plaintiffs prevents baseless claims from being filed. The 
danger of frivolous suits is the high profile nature of claims and the concommitant mixed pressures on 
a government that result from a suit against a private corporate defendant. See generally id. 
 The potential for corporate liability that would reduce a country’s foreign investment can, 
however, provide a very strong incentive to a government to improve its human rights record. Id. 
Moreover, this pressure will not likely be misused by greedy plaintiffs because private corporations 
can only be held liable under the ATCA for the most egregious violations of human rights, such as 
slavery, genocide, and war crimes. See supra notes 110, 159 and accompanying text. The heinous 
nature of such crimes is undisputed, and they cannot be justified by fitting them under the rubric of an 
“economic priority.” See supra Parts II.C.1, 3, 4 for a discussion of court decisions finding certain 
actions so universally condemned that they have become prohibited by international law. In addition, 
the rationale behind requiring litigants in a dispute to have “public accountability” is not persuasive. 
Our system of government is more concerned with the checks and balances between branches of 
government than with making plaintiffs to a dispute politically accountable. See, e.g ., HERBERT JACOB 
ET AL. ,  COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21-24 (1996) (noting the 
political nature of U.S. courts and its use of the adversarial system). In any event, many checks already 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/6
p327 Poullaos book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:52 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] USING THE ATCA TO COMBAT AUTOCRATS 353 
 
 
 
 
with high damages awards  is not the method by which grave international 
issues should be resolved.201 
1. Politicization of the Judiciary 
At the heart of much skepticism surrounding the ATCA lies the belief that 
the courts should simply not be involved in international relations matters.202 
The act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine, and the arguments 
by some scholars concerned with the politicization of the courts all underlie 
this position. 203 However, as the Supreme Court has noted, this knee-jerk 
reaction against adjudicating issues associated with foreign relations is 
unwarranted.204 The judicial branch has often been involved in political 
matters.205 In fact, it is probably more accurate to conceptualize the 
judiciary’s role in the system as bringing to bear an independent judgment on 
the matter, as opposed to the concern that the matter itself will destroy the 
independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, the fact that international 
relations involve some political issues should not be used to preclude the 
involvement of the judiciary, especially in the adjudication of human rights 
as fundamental as the freedom from genocide, torture, and war crimes. That 
these acts are forbidden by international law is undebatable. 
 
 
prevent misuse of the ATCA. See Rosen, supra note 23, at 491. Courts primarily provide a check 
against specious claims, and they are often helped by briefs from the Department of State. In fact, the 
Kadic Court affirmatively consulted the Department of State. See supra note 139 and accompanying 
text. Furthermore, the many hurdles plaintiffs must overcome to bring an ATCA claim will severely 
limit their number. As one example, commentators point to the difficulty that plaintiffs often encounter 
when attempting to bring an ATCA claim, including the fact that no bright line rule yet exists on the 
act of state doctrine or the political question doctrine. See Rosen, supra note 23, at 491. See also Perl, 
supra note 178, at 788-92. A plaintiff would have to be very determined and very lucky to successfully 
bring a purely harassing and baseless claim. 
 201. Scholars argue that reform in a country’s human rights standards should be the result of a 
more controlled approach, such as deliberation by foreign policy experts, instead of ad hoc litigation. 
See generally Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 11. Commentators reason that not all countries can share 
the same goals concerning their economic priorities or development policies. Id. 
 202. See Thadhani, supra note 11, at 636-37. 
 203. The act of state and political question doctrines overlap in this sense because they are both 
concerned with fundamental separation of powers principles. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). See supra note 176. 
 204.  The Court in Baker v. Carr made it clear that “it is error to suppose that every case or 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” 369 U.S. 186, 211 
(1962). 
 205. Perhaps the most striking contemporary example is the judicial involvement in the 2000 
presidential elections at both the federal and state levels.  
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2. Litigation as the Weapon of Choice 
The argument that haphazard litigation and the “clumsy weapons” of 
massive damages awards are inappropriate methods of dealing with human 
rights abuses deserves close scrutiny.206 The proponents of this argument 
assert that “smart sanctions,” which can be carefully formulated and imposed 
by the executive, should be used instead.207 However, these “massive” 
damages awards have gone unpaid in all ATCA cases so far.208 In fact, most 
ATCA plaintiffs rely on free services provided by nongovernmental 
organizations to organize and bring their claims to court.209 The damages 
awards at the moment serve two functions: as a public declaration for the 
plaintiffs and as a constraint on the human rights violator’s freedom to enter 
the United States in the future for fear of having his assets attached by the 
court.210 
The weapons of damages awards could conceivably still be termed 
“clumsy” in that they are not narrowly tailored to a specific type of violation. 
However, ATCA plaintiffs generally have received no redress at all prior to 
filing suit. In fact, the very failure of the Japanese government to offer so 
much as an apology drove the Japanese “comfort women” to sue.211 
Congress “ignored” the Mugabe plaintiffs212 when it failed to pass the 
 
 
 206. See generally Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 11. 
 207. Id. at 113. The scholars’ argument is that carefully tailored sanctions would more effectively 
achieve their purpose because they can be directed at individual leaders rather than adversely affecting 
the general population, which such sanctions are supposed to protect. Id. 
 208. See generally Amon, supra note 166. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 11, at 106 (noting that the “principal benefit of [ATCA] suits 
to their plaintiffs is the public attention they generate”). Travel restrictions on the violator have a very 
real effect as well. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe was nearly placed under citizen’s arrest in 
London for human rights violations, and has not been back to the United Kingdom since that time. See 
Mugabe: UK set ‘gay gangsters’ on me, BBC NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ 
english/world/africa/newsid_508000/508712.stm. An activist from a gay pressure group in the United 
Kingdom attempted to perform a citizen’s arrest on Mugabe for his alleged human rights abuses 
against the people of Zimbabwe. Id. The same activist attempted the arrest a second time in Belgium. 
Tatchell defends Mugabe ‘Arrest,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 6, 2001 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk 
/newsid_1204000/1204719.stm. Mugabe has now been found liable under the ATCA in the United 
States and will likely be extremely hesitant to continue living the lifestyle of international travel that 
he has so enjoyed during his twenty years in power. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (entering default judgment against Mugabe and holding that while Mugabe enjoyed 
head of state immunity, he may be held liable as the head of his political party because he was sued in 
both capacities). 
 211. See 15 to Sue Japan in U.S. over Sex Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2000, at A5. The District 
Court for the District of Columbia has since dismissed the “comfort women” suit. See Hwang Geum 
Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2001) (dismissing suit on the basis of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act with no discussion of the ATCA). 
 212. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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Zimbabwe Democracy Act immediately after parliamentary election violence 
in that country.213 The United States normalized trade relations with China214 
despite the human rights violations for which the Li Peng plaintiffs filed 
suit.215 The courts, through the ATCA, are therefore providing a much 
needed forum to empower disenchanted victims after the executive and 
legislative branches have passed on the issue and subsequently neglected it. 
An ATCA suit has enormous potential to spur future negotiation and perhaps 
encourage a settlement.216 Even if the somewhat predictable patte rn of 
ATCA suits can be termed “haphazard,” these suits are better than forgoing 
negotiation on the issue because of the fundamental rights involved in almost 
every ATCA case.217 
Finally, the United States is not alone in bearing the perceived burden of 
righting international wrongs. In fact, “English law relies heavily on 
precedent from the United States” in delineating the “proper relationship 
between domestic and international law.”218 In addition, New Zealand is at 
the forefront of a new approach in sovereign immunity law in the context of 
jus cogens violations.219 Modern ATCA litigation, then, is leading the way 
for the United States and the rest of the world to finally deal forcefully with 
violators of human rights. Nothing short of a fundamental change in the way 
politicians deal with these violators should stop this truly phenomenal 
development. 
 
 
 213. See Iden Wetherell & Rashweat Mukundu, Zimbabwe Democracy Bill Stalls, ZIM. INDEP., 
Sept. 22, 2000, at 1. Subsequent to the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York against Mugabe, the U.S. Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery 
Act (ZDERA). Christopher Marquis, U.S. Is Trying to Lure Zimbabwe to Democracy , N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2001, at A14. ZDERA has been described as a type of “targeted sanction” in that it imposes 
sanctions on President Mugabe and his ruling elite directly while leaving the innocent citizens of the 
country untouched. Sanctions Loom for Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS, Dec. 5, 2001 at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1693000/1693150.stm. 
 214. See CNN.COM, Clinton Signs China Trade Bill Tuesday, http://www.cnn.com/2000/ 
ALLPOLITICS/stories/10/10/clinton.china/index.html (last modified Oct. 10, 2000). 
 215. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 216. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 11, at 108 (observing that while political and private 
negotiation has ultimately settled many disputes, “it was litigation that put the issue on the agenda in 
the first place”). 
 217. The holding in Kadic effectively limits ATCA suits against nonstate actors to only those 
involving grave violations of fundamental human rights. Kadic v. Karadzic, 726 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d 
Cir. 1995). Genocide is a cognizable claim against a nonstate actor, whereas torture is not. Id. See 
supra note 110. 
 218. Rosen, supra note 23, at 507-08. 
 219. Id. at 513. 
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IV. THE WAY FORWARD 
The ATCA has yielded tremendous gains in empowering the United 
States judiciary to bring to justice autocratic leaders who have little or no 
concern for human rights. However, a much more complete response is 
needed.220 Before this response can occur the problem must accurately 
defined.  
At the heart of an ATCA claim is a plaintiff who has been seriously 
wronged, invariably by a political establishment that is pursuing its own 
objectives regardless of the human cost. The plaintiffs in the Mugabe lawsuit 
are a clear example of the high costs inflicted by the single-minded pursuit of 
political self-interest.221 The plaintiffs are all victims of state -sponsored 
political violence committed by an administration attempting to hold on to 
power by any means necessary and for whom the resulting loss of life and 
disregard for basic human rights are no barrier.222 The plaintiffs incurred the 
wrath of the state and truly have nowhere else to turn.223 
In addition, many observers accuse Mugabe of using the state 
instrumentality for his own personal enrichment.224 Such observers claim that 
Mugabe’s primary concern lies not with the good of his constituents, but with 
his own personal wealth and power.225 Furthermore, the immense power 
inherent in the machinery of even a small third-world state is no match for a 
despised and outcast individual, despite what the international order defines 
as “human rights.”226 In the case against Mugabe, the District Court for the 
 
 
 220. The goal of such a response should be to eliminate the source of the human rights violations 
and not merely to compensate the victim of one particular instance of such. 
 221. The plaintiffs in the Mugabe suit all allege that he committed atrocities during the run-up t o 
parliamentary elections in which Mugabe’s party sought a victory at any cost. See Tachiona v. 
Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also supra note 7. 
 222. Such violations continued after the filing of the suit, and even after the default judgment was 
entered for the plaintiffs. ‘They Say the Law Can Burn in Hell . . .,’ THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 3, 2001, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4145507,00.html; Ann M. Simmons, Tension Rises 
as Zimbabwe Tries to Stifle Dissent, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at A20. 
 223. See Zimbabwe President Accused of Orchestrating Terror in U.S. Suit, CNN.COM Sept. 13, 
2000, at http://cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/09/10/us.mugabesued.ap/index.html. See also Forced to 
Flee Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS Feb. 5, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid 
_818000/818766.stm. 
 224. See Rotberg, Africa’s Mess, Mugabe’s Mayhem, FOR. AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 47, 53 
(denouncing Mugabe’s decision to send Zimbabwean troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
exchange for diamond concessions from that government). 
 225. See id. The United Nations has denounced the Zimbabwe government’s economic “looting” 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo. DR Congo ‘Looters’ Condemned, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 2001, 
at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1665000/1665952.stm. 
 226. The atrocities mentioned above committed in China, Zimbabwe, and Japan are examples of 
the relative powerlessness of the individual against state machinery. See supra text accompanying 
notes 7-10, 211-15. 
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Southern District of New York entered a default judgment against the 
Zimbabwean president.227 The court found that Mugabe could be held liable 
in his capacity as head of his political party, even though he enjoys head of 
state immunity. 228 Yet, the difficulty attendant in bringing a successful 
ATCA claim, coupled with a money judgment that will only serve to deter a 
defendant’s international travel plans, amounts to only a very small hiccup in 
the running of a well-greased state engine.  
No single congressional act will likely be able to deal with this problem 
conclusively.229 However, the United States and the First World must do all 
they can to prevent themselves from inadvertently aiding violators of 
fundamental human rights. First, countries should take scrupulous care not to 
lend the protection of the state to the personal wealth of these autocrats.230 
Included in this idea is that ATCA remedies should be made easier to collect 
from the individual defendants, given that much of the offending dictators’ 
assets lie in First World countries’ financial institutions.231 In addition, 
corporate responsibility in dealings with foreign countries is a necessity. This 
responsibility could take the form of mandating careful analysis of the likely 
immediate impacts on human rights arising from an intended project.232 The 
ATCA, therefore, is one small part of a possible overall scheme to at least 
lessen the curse of serious violators of human rights. 
 
 
 227. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 228. Id. at 309. 
 229. Rather, the solution will most likely have to involve international cooperation between 
countries that have already begun dealing with the problem judicially. See supra text accompanying 
notes 218-19. See also Thomas E. Vanderbloemen, 50 DUKE L.J. 917, 931 (2000) (discussing the 
possible influence on ATCA suits of the proposed Hague convention, which “would obligate a 
contracting state’s courts to observe certain rules for jurisdiction . . . and to recognize and enforce civil 
and commercial judgments rendered by the courts of other contracting states as long as the rendering 
court had observed the prescribed jurisdictional rules”). 
 230. Care should also be taken to prevent dictators from publicly floating stock in companies that 
profit from ill-gotten gains. One example is the recent furor over the fact that Mugabe’s political party 
is involved with Oryx, a company involved in extracting so-called “blood diamonds” from the former 
Zaire. See Diamond Row Scuppers Float, BBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ 
english/business/newsid_787000/787698.stm (noting the British government’s influence in preventing 
Oryx from floating stock on the London Stock Exchange due to that company’s involvement with 
“blood diamonds” and the company’s murky ties with the Zimbabwean government). 
 231. See Sanctions Loom for Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS, Dec. 5, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ 
english/world/africa/newsid_1693000/1693150.stm (describing sanctions that have the effect of 
“freezing foreign assets belonging to President Robert Mugabe”) (emphasis added). For example, 
Congress could pass financial regulations that make it easier to track and freeze a foreign dictator’s 
U.S. assets. 
 232. The similarity to an endangered species impact assessment is intentional because human life 
should be valued more highly than that of an endangered wild species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) 
(1994). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The recent development in ATCA litigation is without a doubt 
extraordinarily positive. However, in its current state, the Act is merely one 
small contribution to what should be a comprehensive scheme aimed at the 
root cause of the problem—defiant autocrats using state machinery for 
personal goals. Once a comprehensive approach is accomplished, 
international human rights will achieve the important stature that their nature 
demands. 
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